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Abstract: Banana production in Turkey represents a small fraction of that required to meet domestic consumption. Domestic
consumption totaled 188,000 t in 2000, whereas production amounted to just 64,000 t, or 34% of consumption. The gap between
consumption and production is made up by imports and 5 multinational firms control the flow of more than 80% of the global
banana trade. Given this firm dominance in the world trade of bananas, oligopoly theory would suggest the presence of underlying
structural forces that could facilitate price-enhancing market power. As such, this study develops an integrated trade and new
empirical industrial organization (NEIO) model of the banana trade and this model is estimated econometrically to derive the degree
of market power in the Turkish market for banana imports. The 1984-2000 data period is used and the model’s results yield a
market power parameter of 0.19. This result shows that the banana import market in Turkey is not perfectly competitive, but that
the behavior of firms is much closer to price-taking than to collusion.
Key Words: market power, banana import market, new empirical industrial organization, international trade, Turkey

Türkiye Muz ‹thalat›nda Pazar Gücünün Belirlenmesi
Özet: Türkiye’nin muz üretimi iç tüketimin küçük bir oran›n› karfl›lamaktad›r. 2000 de¤erleriyle tüketim 188,000 t civar›nda iken
üretim 64,000 t olarak gerçekleflerek toplam tüketimin ancak % 34’ü karfl›lanm›flt›r. Tüketim ve üretim aras›ndaki bu fark ithalat
yoluyla karfl›lanmakta olup uluslararas› befl firma dünya muz ticaretinin % 80’ini kontrol etmektedir. Bu firmalar›n dünya muz
ticaretindeki etkinli¤i dikkate al›nd›¤›nda, oligopol teorisi belli bafll› yap›sal güçlerin varl›¤›n›n pazar gücünü art›r›c› etki yapabilece¤ini
ileri sürmektedir. Bu çal›flmada, muz ticareti için d›fl ticaret ve Yeni Endüstriyel Organizasyonu bütün olarak dikkate alan bir model
gelifltirilmifltir. Bu model ile Türkiye muz ithalat› pazar›ndaki pazar gücü derecesi ekonometrik olarak hesaplanm›flt›r. 1984-2000
dönemi verileri kullan›lm›fl ve araflt›rma dönemi için pazar gücü katsay›s› 0.19 olarak bulunmufltur. Bu sonuç, Türkiye muz ithalat›n›n
tam rekabet koflullar›nda gerçekleflmedi¤ini ancak firmalar›n davran›fllar›n›n tam rekabet koflullar›na, monopolden daha yak›n
oldu¤unu ortaya koymaktad›r.
Anahtar Sözcükler: pazar gücü, muz ithal pazar›, yeni endüstriyel organizasyon, uluslararas› ticaret, Türkiye

Introduction
Bananas are the fifth largest agricultural commodity
in world trade; they are exceeded only by cereals, sugar,
coffee and cocoa. Bananas are produced in more than
120 countries, but just 6 of these countries -- India,
Brazil, Ecuador, Philippines, China and Indonesia -account for 63% of total production. Despite this high
concentration of production, just 21% of the annual 68

million t of bananas and plantains are traded on the world
market. Most of this trade originates from Latin America
and the Caribbean, as banana exports provide a crucial
source of income for these countries. More specifically,
Ecuador, Costa Rica and Colombia account for more than
55% of total banana exports. On the import side, the
United States, the European Union (EU) and Japan
represent the largest import markets. Respectively, these

* Correspondence to: shatirli@ziraat.sdu.edu.tr

367

Published by Research Showcase @ UMarin, 2003

1

TURKISH JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, Vol. 27 [2003], No. 6, Art. 7

Measuring the Market Power of the Banana Import Market in Turkey

countries account for 29, 23 and 7% of all imports (FAO,
2001).
In addition to a high concentration of banana trade
among a few countries, this trade is also highly
concentrated among a few multinational firms. United
Brands (Chiquita) and Standard Fruit (Dole) account for
roughly 50% of world trade in bananas, and a third firm,
Del Monte, accounts for another 15%. Two other
companies with relatively large market shares are Noboa
and Fyffes, controlling about 18% of the banana trade.
Given the positive relationship economists generally posit
between concentration and market influence, the
aforementioned banana firms are expected to exhibit
some market power in both exporting and importing
countries. Based on economic theory, these firms are
likely to have some influence on the extent to which
producer countries compete with each other, the extent
to which governments accept tax impositions and tariff
preferences, the ease or difficulty with which loans are
extended, and the extent to which policy initiatives are
developed for social and environmental deregulation
(Dixit, 1984; Brander and Spencer, 1985).
Multinational firms are also likely to have some
influence on the implementation of food and trade
policies. Chiquita, for instance, filed a complaint against
the banana import regime of the EU, and the United
States was instrumental in directing this case to the
World Trade Organization. Much of the success of
multinational banana firms is undoubtedly related to their
organizational structure. These firms are integrated
vertically up the chain, either owning or contracting with
plantations. Furthermore, these firms own sea transport
and distribution networks in importing countries
(Chambron, 1999). This type of organizational structure
is typically associated with economies of scale in
production and the firms involved are likely to face an
environment that is conducive to the exercise of market
power in the banana trade.
Market competitiveness for banana imports in Turkey
is an interesting area of study because banana production
has shown extraordinary growth over the past 2 decades.
From 1984 to 2000, banana production in Turkey
significantly increased, rising from 35,000 to 64,000 t - an increase of nearly 83% (SIS, 2000). Even though
Turkey has experienced a substantial increase in banana
production, it is still far below domestic consumption. As

an illustration of the growing gap between domestic
production and total banana consumption, banana
imports have risen from $22,000 in 1984 to $49 million
in 2000. These rising imports have not resulted just from
population growth, as per-capita consumption of bananas
has risen during this same period from 0.6 to 2.0 kg
(FAO, 2001). Since Turkey has suitable climatic
conditions for banana production in the Mediterranean
region, the Turkish government has been implementing
policies to protect producers. For example, the
government increased import taxes for bananas during
2002 from 119% to 149% (EXPCT, 2002).
This study seeks to extend trade analysis work by
providing an empirical estimate of market
competitiveness for banana imports in Turkey. Some
related work on the banana trade includes a study by
Borrell (1994) in which he analyzed the EU banana
import regime and derived welfare changes under
different policy scenarios. Read (1994) studied the
importation of bananas into the German market and he
concluded that the market is dominated by a few
multinational firms that enjoy scale economies in
refrigerated shipping and distribution. Deodhar and
Sheldon (1995) derived an empirical estimate of market
power in the German banana import market and they
concluded that the market is imperfectly competitive.
The main objective of this study is to develop and
estimate a structural econometric model of market power
in the banana import market of Turkey. Once estimated,
the model is expected to yield price, income and
production elasticities for bananas as well as a set of
results that can be used to determine the impact of
import prices on retail prices. Given the high
concentration of the world banana trade and the rising
value of banana imports in Turkey, these results are likely
to be of interest for at least 2 reasons. First, this paper
applies the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO)
methodology, a methodology that has gained acceptance
for market power studies, and therefore the results
derived will provide further empirical verification of the
methodology as well as shed insight on the behavior of
multinational firms engaged in Turkey’s banana trade.
Second, the results derived are likely to prove crucial for
assessing the degree of competitiveness of banana
imports and for determining the feasibility of existing
trade and agricultural policies.
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Material and Model Development
Dixit (1984) has provided a theoretical framework for
trade under an imperfectly competitive market structure
and several economists have used this framework to
derive empirical estimates of market power in trade
(Lopez and You, 1993; Buschena and Perloff, 1991; Karp
and Perloff, 1989; Deodhar and Sheldon, 1995). A
fundamental characteristic of these studies is their
application of the partial equilibrium framework from
NEIO theory to trade analyses. Interestingly, Dixit’s
theoretical analyses provided a foundation for the
integration of trade theory with industrial organizational
theory. Given imperfectly competitive markets, Dixit
argued that factors such as economies of scale and scope,
entry barriers, marginal cost differences, product
differentiation and strategic interaction become just as
relevant for trade analyses as they are for industry
analyses. Indeed several economists have developed
theoretical models of trade that analyze the effects of one
or more of these factors (Brander and Krugman, 1980;
Brander and Spencer, 1982; Krugman, 1982; Krishna,
1983). A major contribution of these models has been
their ability to show the feasibility of trade under
conditions unrelated to comparative advantage.
Although NEIO methodology is employed in this study,
it is of interest to note that this approach emanated from
concerns about the methodological soundness of an
earlier approach, known as the structure-conductperformance (SCP) method. Much of the improvement in
methodology is related to the fact that NEIO focuses on a
single industry or market, whereas SCP focused on crosssection studies of many industries or markets. Further,
the methodological roots of SCP called for marginal cost
data, but practical applications of the approach required
the substitution of proxy measures for marginal cost and
other performance measures. Some of these measures
included average cost, accounting profits, price-costmargins and Tobin’s Q. Regardless of the measure used,
a fundamental weakness of SCP studies was their attempt
to establish a linkage between structure and performance
with cross-sectional data. Economic theory, however,
suggests that causality between structure and
performance can be established only with time series data
(Bresnahan and Schmalensee, 1987).
As developed by Bresnahan (1982), the NEIO
approach allows one to analyze the extent of market
power in a market within a demand and supply

framework. Typically, a demand equation, a marginal
cost equation, and an optimality equation representing
the equilibrium of marginal revenue and marginal cost are
specified and estimated as a simultaneous system. Market
power is identified by examining the change in the pricecost relationship from one equilibrium position to
another. Critical to the determination of the market
power parameter is the statistical significance of the
variable, which rotates either the demand function or cost
schedule. Profit maximization is an underlying
assumption of the model, although the estimated market
power parameter measures the amount of market power
exercised by firms (Perloff, 1991). In a nutshell, the NEIO
approach uses firm or aggregate level data, integrates
microeconomic theory with structural econometric
models, and develops measures of market power based
on the price and quantity decisions of firms.
Although alternative specifications have been used to
measure market power or other market structure
relationships over the past 2 decades, this study extends
the approach of Bresnahan (1982). Market demand in an
industry is considered to be one in which n firms produce a
homogeneous product (q1, q2,...qn) and industry output is
n

Q = ∑ qi .
i=1

With industry as the unit of analysis, the market demand
equation is given by the implicit function
Qt = Q(Pt,Zt),

(1)

where Qt is the total quantity demanded, Pt is the price of
output, Zt represents all exogenous variables affecting
demand such as income and prices for substitute
products, and t is a time subscript. Due to simultaneity
between Pt and Qt, the inverse demand function can be
expressed as Pt = P(Qt, Zt). Industry revenue is defined as
Rt = Pt*Qt and, thus, perceived marginal revenue {MRt
(λ)} can be written as
MRt(λ) = P t + λQt dP t/dQt ,

(2)

where λ is defined as an index of the degree of market
power -- the gap between market price and industry
marginal cost. Bresnahan (1982) and Perloff (1991)
argue that λ will range from 0 for perfect competition to
1 for monopoly. Alternatively, the market power
parameter, λ, can be interpreted as a conjectural
variation that describes how firm 1 conjectures that other
firms will vary their output choices when firm 1 makes a
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small change in its output. In equilibrium, marginal
revenue will equal marginal cost and this relationship can
be written as
P t + λQt dP t/dQt = MC.

(3)

If λ is estimated to equal zero, equation 3 becomes the
profit-maximizing condition that price must equal MC and
MR. Thus, firms in this industry would be characterized
as exhibiting either Bertrand-Nash or competitive
behavior. If firms demonstrate perfectly collusive
behavior in an industry, λ would take on a value of 1.
We use the aforementioned concepts to estimate the
degree of imperfection in the Turkish banana import
market. To estimate the market power parameter, λ, an
optimality equation that represents the equilibrium of
marginal revenue and marginal cost is specified. To
continue with the estimation procedures, a functional
form for industry demand and aggregate marginal cost is
selected. For banana imports, the demand function is
assumed to be linear and it is expressed as
IMPQt = β0 + β1Prt + β2It + β3PCBt +
β4Qt + β5LIMPQt-1 + elt

(4)

(5)

where Pit is the import price of bananas, representing a
proxy for the cost of bananas to retailers; and T is a time
trend variable expressed as 1,2,3,…n. This variable is
included in the marginal cost equation to try and capture
changes in marginal costs that may arise from
technological advances in transportation, storage, etc. A
similar functional form of marginal cost was also used by
Deodhar and Sheldon (1995). Substituting the marginal
cost function (5) into equation (3) and making the
necessary substitution of IMPQt for Qt and Prt for Pt, we
get the optimality equation
Prt = α0 +α1Pit + α2T +α3IMPQt + e2t

To derive the market power statistic of interest (λ),
regression equations (4) and (6) are estimated with
annual data over the period 1984-2000. These data were
collected from several sources. Retail price data for
bananas were obtained from the SIS Retail Price Statistics
(SIS, 2001a). Data related to the aggregate quantities of
bananas imported into Turkey, the import price of
bananas, per-capita banana consumption and banana
production for Turkey were collected from the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2001). Data on per-capita
income are taken from the SIS Basic Economic Indicators
(SIS, 2001b). All nominal variables involving prices and
income were deflated by the consumer price index and a
gross national product deflator, respectively.

Results and Discussion

where IMPQt is the total quantity of bananas imported
into Turkey (tons year-1); Prt is the retail price of bananas
(TL tons-1 year-1); It is the annual per-capita income ($);
PCBt is per-capita consumption of bananas (kg year-1); Qt
is the banana production of Turkey (tons year-1); LIMPQt-1
1 is the lag quantity of bananas imported (tons year );
and e1t is the error term that is normally distributed with
mean µ and variance σ2. The marginal cost (MCt) equation
is specified as
MCt = α0 +α1Pit + α2T,

Rewriting equation (4) in inverse form and taking the
derivative of this equation with respect to IMPQt, we
derive [dPrt / dIMPQt] = 1/β1. Further, substituting 1/β1
for [dPrt / dIMPQt] in the α3 expression, we derive λ
= -β1*α3.

(6)

As expressed, α3 = –λ [dPrt / dIMPQt] and e2t is N (µ, σ2).

To measure the degree of imperfection in the Turkish
banana import market, equations (4) and (6) are
estimated based on annual data for the period 19842000. Since these equations represent a simultaneous
equations system with IMPQt and Prt being determined
simultaneously, we estimated the system of equations
using two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the
exogenous variables used were import price, per-capita
banana consumption, banana production, lag quantity of
banana import, per-capita income and time trend. In
addition, we employed three-stage least squares (3SLS)
estimation; however, no significant improvement over
the 2SLS results was observed. All estimations were
carried out using Shazam 8.0 software. The parameter
estimates, their t-ratios and other statistics are given in
Table 1.
The overall model is plausible in terms of R2, the
standard error of estimates and the statistical significance
of individual parameters. The R2 values of demand and
optimality equations are 0.96 and 0.82, respectively.
Looking at the demand equation, the Durbin-h statistics
of 1.44 lies within ±1.96 at the 5% significance level.
Hence, the null hypothesis of no first-order
autocorrelation cannot be rejected. However, the DurbinWatson ratio lies in an inconclusive range for detecting
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Table 1. Two-stage least squares estimation results.

Demand Equation
Intercept
Retail price of bananas (Prt)
Per-capita income (It)
Per-capita banana consumption (PCBt)
Banana production (Qt)
Lag quantity of banana imports (LIMPQt-1)
R-Square
Durbin-h

Coefficient

t- Ratio

Elasticity

20255
-498
17.97
44852
-0.99
0.29
0.96
1.44

0.90
-2.02*
1.99*
5.62*
-1.69**
2.89*

-0.31
0.54
0.66
-0.42
0.26

20.63
1294
0.39E-03
3.05
0.82
2.32
0.99

2.81*
3.64*
4.15*
3.17*

0.41
0.62
0.76

Optimality Equation
Intercept
Import price (Pit)
Import quantity (IMPQt)
Time trend (T)
R – Square
Durbin-Watson
System R – Square
Note: * Indicates significance at 5% level.

** Indicates significance at 10% level.

the existence of autocorrelation. For this reason, a
nonparametric runs test was applied to test
autocorrelation in the optimality equation (Gujarati,
1995). The runs test results showed that there is no
first-order autocorrelation at the 95% confidence level.
As shown in Table 1, all the parameters have the
expected signs, and they are statistically significant. The
price elasticity for the retail price of bananas is –0.31,
implying that a given change in price will result in a less
than proportionate change in quantity imported. One of
the determinants of banana imports, per-capita income,
was statistically significant with an elasticity of 0.54. This
elasticity measure suggests that banana imports into
Turkey increase at a rate less than proportionate to
income changes. The results also show that increased percapita banana consumption leads to increased banana
imports; this is expected since banana production is
insufficient to meet domestic demand. Another important
variable that affects banana imports is domestic banana
production. Economic theory suggests that increased
banana production should lead to a reduction in banana
imports. Empirical results support this theoretical
construct as shown by the production elasticity of -0.42,
implying that a 10% increase in banana production would
lead to a 4.2% decrease in banana imports. Lagged
quantity of banana import was included in the demand

equation to capture import dependency within Turkey.
The coefficient of this variable has a positive sign and it is
statistically significant, suggesting that the import
dependency for bananas increased for the relevant
period. Because a large percentage of Turkey’s banana
consumption is imported, it was hypothesized that the
retail price would be directly related to changes in the
import price, and this relationship is confirmed by the
positive sign and statistical significance of this parameter
in the optimality equation. In addition to its positive sign
and statistical significance, this parameter has an elasticity
of 0.41, indicating a change in the retail price smaller
than the change in the import price. The positive sign for
the trend variable in the optimality equation shows an
upward movement of the retail price of bananas during
the 1984-2000 period.
Although the aforementioned discussion of the
empirical results is insightful, a key component of any
market power study involves the market power
parameter, λ. An earlier discussion showed that this
parameter involved both β1 and α3, and these values are
shown in Table 1 to be β1 = -498 and α3 = 0.39E-03.
Critical to the determination of λ, of course, is the
statistical significance of these parameters, as shown in
Table 1. With λ = -β1*α3, the market power parameter
for this market is λ = -(-498)*(0.39E-03) = 0.19. On a
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continuum from competition to monopoly, the results
suggest that the banana import market in Turkey is closer
to competition than to monopoly. This was somewhat
unexpected, given the fact that the banana world market
is dominated by a few large international firms. Stated
differently, increased concentration of banana exports
among a few companies has not resulted in an excessive
amount of monopoly power. This result might stem
partly from recent actions by the Turkish government to
impose high import taxes to protect domestic producers.
Indeed, higher import taxes have led to a decline in the
value of banana imports from $49 million in 2000, to
roughly $16 million in 2001. Moreover, this protection
of domestic producers through taxes has led to an
increase in banana production. Over the past 3 years
(1999-2002), banana production in Turkey has more
than doubled, from 34,000 to 70,000 t. All these factors
have undoubtedly played a role in reducing the market
power of multinational banana firms in the Turkish
banana market.
Another factor that may have influenced the empirical
results is improved cost efficiency for the firms involved
in banana exports. All of the banana firms involved in
exports are vertically integrated along the many stages of
the banana marketing chain, and, given the imperfect
competitiveness along this marketing chain, it is quite
conceivable that these firms gained some cost efficiency.
Indeed, a study by Read (1994) points to significant gains
in economies of scale for banana export firms at the
refrigerated shipping and distribution channel. Of course,
a factor that could have significantly enhanced the
exercise of market power is product differentiation, but
insufficient data did not allow us to capture this aspect of

the banana trade. Nevertheless, the estimated λ value
suggests that the import price of bananas is higher than
would normally exist and this means that consumers are
paying higher prices because of imperfect competition in
this market. These results are consistent with prior
studies. Deodhar and Sheldon (1995) reached a similar
conclusion in their study of the German banana import
market.

Conclusions
Banana consumption in Turkey is highly dependent on
imports, and imports have experienced significant growth
over the past 2 decades. These imports come from a
concentrated market that is controlled by a few
multinational firms. To try and gain an understanding of
the impact of this high concentration on banana prices,
this study has applied the NEIO paradigm to the Turkish
banana market. The empirical results were derived with
data for the 1984-2000 period and, while these results
show less than perfectly competitive pricing behavior, the
observed pricing behavior is closer to competition than to
collusion. Furthermore, the findings of this study show
several variables to have a significant impact on import
quantity. Included among these variables are the retail
price of bananas, banana production and per-capita
income. The implication of these findings for the Turkish
banana market is that the import price of bananas is
higher than what would exist if the market operated
under perfectly competitive conditions. To sumup, the
banana exporting firms are exercising some market
power, but not in proportion to their control over market
supplies.
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